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Multiplicity Needs Coherence – 
Towards a Unifying Framework for 
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In this commentary, I focus on Albert Newen’s multiplicity view (MV) and aim to
provide an alternative framework in which it can be embedded. Newen claims that
social understanding draws on at least four different epistemic mechanisms, thus
rejecting the idea that there is a default mechanism for social cognition. I claim
that MV runs the risk of combining elements that have been described in meta-
physically incompatible theories. I will argue that multiplicity needs coherence,
which can be achieved by applying the theoretical framework of first-, second-,
and third-order embodiment (1-3E; Metzinger 2014) to the study of social cogni-
tion. The modified version of this theory, 1-3sE (first-, second-, and third-order
social embodiment), can serve as a unifying framework for a pluralistic account of
social understanding. 
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1 Introduction
The multiplicity view (MV) is part of Newen’s
person  model  theory (PMT) and claims that
individuals apply multiple epistemic strategies
to make sense of other people, namely simula-
tion,  theoretical  inference,  direct  perception
(DP) and primary interaction.1 He thus inter-
estingly argues against the view that there is
1 For a brief explanation of the terms, see  Newen this collection,
pp. 1-2.
something like a default strategy of social un-
derstanding. In the following, I will scrutinize
MV and, in doing so, attempt to reach three
goals:  First,  I reconstruct the main claims of
MV and suggest that the development of such
a pluralistic account of social cognition can be
seen as contributing to the so-called “interact-
ive turn” (Overgaard &  Michael 2013; section
“The multiplicity view”). MV has the potential
Quadt, L. (2015). Multiplicity Needs Coherence – Towards a Unifying Framework for Social Understanding - A Commentary on Albert Newen.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 26(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571112 1 | 18
www.open-mind.net
to  integrate  bodily  and  interactive  contexts,
while  also paying more attention to the phe-
nomenology of social encounters. Second, I ar-
gue that current pluralistic depictions of social
cognition – of which MV is a clear example –
run the risk of operating under (often implicit)
contradictory background assumptions. In the
section “Multiplicity  needs coherence”,  I  first
show  how  and  why  different  social  cognitive
mechanisms have been described under differ-
ent  sets  of  metaphysical  assumptions.  Since
these  assumptions  are  often  contradictory,  a
coherent version of MV cannot simply claim to
combine them. I then go on to argue that the
concept  of  DP as  an epistemic mechanism is
either metaphysically incompatible with simu-
lation and theorizing, empirically implausible,
or – if it is re-formulated so that it fits a rep-
resentationalist description – does not meet the
goal of integrating embodiment and phenomen-
ology  anymore.  I  will  thus  claim  that  DP
should be used as  a  phenomenological  rather
than epistemological concept. My third goal is
then to suggest novel ways of adopting a plur-
alistic perspective on social cognition, while re-
maining  in  metaphysically  coherent  territory.
Metzinger’s theory of first-, second-, and third-
order  embodiment  (1-3E)  is  a  conceptual
framework  that  combines  representationalist
and non-representationalist levels of analysis in
order to show how a specific phenomenal qual-
ity (e.g., phenomenal selfhood) can arise within
an  embodied  system  (Metzinger 2014).  Met-
zinger  claims that  phenomenal  properties  are
computationally grounded in a representation
of  one’s  body  (the  “body  model”,  ibid.,
p. 273), which in turn is physically implemen-
ted by bodily and neural structures. I aim to
apply this  idea to the study of  social  under-
standing (section “1-3sE – Levels of social em-
bodiment”).  This  application  enables  a  more
fine-grained depiction of different phenomenal
qualities in social encounters and shows their
putative relation to representational and phys-
ical counterparts. I ask which parts of the body
model could potentially be shared and thus be
exploited for  a  skillful  navigation of  an indi-
vidual’s  social  environment.  In  a  last  step,  I
sketch the physical grounds of social cognition.
2 The multiplicity view
The multiplicity view (MV) is part of Albert
Newen’s  person  model  theory  (PMT),  which
provides a rich and detailed account of social
understanding.  It  attempts  to  answer  two
central questions in the research field of social
cognition, which the author neatly differenti-
ates and then again integrates into a compre-
hensive theory. The first question asks which
epistemic  strategy humans use  to  access  the
mental states of others and to gather informa-
tion about them. Approaches advocating Sim-
ulation Theory (ST; e.g.,  Goldman 2006), as
well as direct perception (DP; e.g.,  Gallagher
2008), have attempted to yield an answer to
that question, while Theory Theory (TT; e.g.,
Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997) and Narrative Prac-
tice  Hypothesis  (NPH;  e.g.,  Hutto 2008)  fo-
cused  on  a  second  question:  How is  the  in-
formation  we  obtain  to  understand  others
stored  and  organized?  By  sorting  out  these
questions, Newen shows that different theories
have tried to tackle different problems, which
I believe to be a very useful and fruitful con-
tribution to the research field. It reveals that
the  four  main  theories  mentioned  above  are
less competitive than originally thought, since,
on  closer  examination,  they  actually  aim  to
give answers to different questions. This view-
point enables one of Newen’s main arguments,
namely that each of these approaches can be
merged into one unified account of social un-
derstanding.  He takes three  steps in  arguing
for his theory. In a first step, he differentiates
between the two questions in the research field
of social cognition mentioned above, thus set-
ting up a dividing line between the vast mani-
fold  of  different  approaches  and  theories.
Secondly,  the  author  puts  forth  a  pluralistic
account  of  social  cognition,  the  multiplicity
view (MV).  In doing so,  he attempts to an-
swer the first question discussed earlier. In a
third step, Newen tackles the second question
of how knowledge about other people is organ-
ized and stored. He claims that this happens
through  the  formation  of  so-called  person
models, hence person model theory (PMT; see
Newen this collection).
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By  laying  out  MV  as  a  pluralistic  ac-
count of social cognition, Newen aims to steer
the discussion in the research field into a dif-
ferent direction, away from debating whether
social  understanding is a form of simulation,
theoretical  inference,  DP  or  interaction.  In-
stead,  he  argues  that  all  four  epistemic
strategies are applied, depending on the social
context (cf.  Newen this collection, p. 7). MV
is of particular interest, because it reflects two
growing  convictions  in  the  research  field.
First, by paying attention to DP and interac-
tion, it does justice to demands that arose in
the  so-called  “interactive  turn”  (Gallotti &
Frith 2013;  Overgaard &  Michael 2013)  and
can thus be seen as part of the movement it-
self. The interactive turn claims that research-
ers have not paid enough attention to the phe-
nomenology  of  social  encounters  (Gallagher
2001), the interactive contexts in which most
social situations are embedded (De Jaegher &
Paolo 2007)  and  the  role  of  the  body  and
emotions in social cognition (Schilbach et al.
2013).  This  directly  relates  to  MV,  since  it
aims to include intuitive ways of social under-
standing that do not necessarily require simu-
lation  and  theoretical  inference  and  thus  to
widen the theoretical scope towards less “cog-
nitivist” views. The second conviction is that
there is more to social cognition than a single
all-purpose  mechanism (Adolphs 2006,  p. 30;
Fiebich & Coltheart in press).2 (Human) social
cognition obviously is  manifold;  it  has many
aspects that are not only phenomenologically
distinct (just think of the different experiences
you have when trying to figure out your ad-
visor’s somewhat cryptic Email, or when try-
ing to make your 4 year-old eat her spinach),
but  also  draws on  several  cognitive  mechan-
isms  that  are  differently  implemented.  It
therefore makes sense that we can find some-
thing useful in each of the four theoretical ap-
proaches  discussed  so  far;  while  ST and TT
are plausible accounts to describe and explain
“higher-level”  social  cognition  that  requires
2 Such a view can already be found in Goldman’s work. He en-
dorses  a  hybrid  account  of  mindreading,  which  describes  “a
number  of  ways  to  blend  simulation  and  theorizing  elements
into  a  mosaic  of  mindreading  possibilities”  (Goldman 2006,
p. 43).
quite sophisticated skills,  other  theories  such
as DP or interaction theory cover more intuit-
ive  ways  of  understanding  others.  Merging
them into a comprehensive theory seems to be
a natural next step.
Newen claims that 
[t]here is no standard default strategy of
understanding  others,  but  in  everyday
cases of understanding others we rely on a
multiplicity of strategies which we vary de-
pending on the context and on our prior
experiences (and eventually also triggered
by explicit training). (this collection, p. 7)
How does he arrive at this conclusion? Newen
argues against the view that only  one of the
mechanisms  that  have  been  proposed  to  be
important  for  social  cognition  (simulation,
theorizing,  DP and  primary  interaction)  can
plausibly be viewed as the default strategy by
which  humans  understand  each  other.  The
main argument against such a single-mechan-
ism view is that their activation seems to be
highly context-dependent. Simulation, accord-
ing to Newen, presupposes similarity between
two  interacting  individuals.  Theorizing  only
applies  in  complex  social  situations  which
need explicit  and thoughtful  disambiguation.
Encountering someone of who we already have
rich prior information activates DP, while so-
cial situations that are easy to understand can
be  disambiguated  by  primary  interaction.
Thus,  Newen concludes that “[o]nly the com-
bination of all four strategies, in full sensitiv-
ity to the context and applied on the basis of
our  experience  in  successfully  using  the
strategies, makes us experts in understanding
others” (ibid., p. 7). 
3 Multiplicity needs coherence
While this surely is an attractive way to de-
scribe  social  understanding,  and does  justice
to  its  oft-proclaimed  manifoldness,  these
mechanisms  have  been  described  in  several
theoretical frameworks that operate under dif-
ferent (and partly contradictory) metaphysical
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background assumptions.3 Thus, a simple com-
bination of them does not come easily. Simula-
tion and theory-based inference have been de-
scribed within a computationalist, cognitivist
framework which often assumes that the mind
is  mainly  a  representational  and  internal
device  (Bruin &  Kästner 2012),  i.e.,  a  func-
tional structure locally realized in the brains
of  individual  organisms.  Bodily  and environ-
mental structures play at most an enabling or
causal role for a specific  internal  mechanism.
In contrast, DP and primary interaction, both
of which are concepts stemming from the phe-
nomenological tradition, have their roots in an
enactive  account  of  cognition  (cf.  Gallagher
2008,  p. 537),  thus rejecting basic  metaphys-
ical  assumptions  of  cognitivism (e.g.,  repres-
entationalism,  reductionism,  mechanistic  ex-
planations;  Rowlands 2009).4 The  theoretical
background  of  DP  and  primary  interaction
views the mind as a non-representational, re-
lational device which emerges within the skill-
ful interaction between organism and environ-
ment: 
The enactive interpretation is not simply a
reinterpretation  of  what  happens  extra-
neurally,  out in the intersubjective world
of action where we anticipate and respond
to  social  affordances.  More  than  this,  it
suggests  a  different  way  of  conceiving
brain  function,  specifically  in  nonrepres-
entational,  integrative  and  dynamical
terms. (Gallagher et al. 2013, p. 422)
More  specifically,  enactive  and  phenomenolo-
gical approaches to social cognition not only see
the body as part of cognitive processing, they
also assign a very important status to interac-
tion. While enactive theories display interaction
as (at least possibly) constituting social cognit-
3 I am well aware of the fact that there are many shades of both cog-
nitivist and enactive views. I will therefore focus on the views of the
authors that have been cited by Newen in the target paper. For a
general introduction, see for example Thompson (2010); Varela et al.
(1993); Rowlands (2009).
4 The difference between enactive and phenomenological theories seems to
boil down to the explanatory scope. While enactivism explicitly claims to
offer a radically different alternative to cognitivism and thus builds a
proper  account  of  cognition  (Varela et  al. 1993)  phenomenology  is
mostly seen as a description of experiential phenomena (Gallagher 2008).
ive  processes  (De  Jaegher &  Paolo 2007,
p. 493),  traditional  mindreading  theories  have
not  even  considered  interaction  to  be  an  ele-
ment which could influence social cognition (cf.
Fuchs & Jaegher 2009, p. 466).
There are several reasons why ST and TT
have been spelled out in a more cognitivist set
of assumptions, while DP and primary interac-
tion have been described in reference to an en-
active framework. Although their roots in the
history of ideas plays an important role, there
are  deeper  systematic  reasons  why  it  makes
sense to couch them in different sets of meta-
physical assumptions. To see this, consider the
relation between the external world and internal
processing in either framework. A rather cognit-
ivist view assumes that the task of the brain is
to  figure out the outside world and that this
world  is  internally  represented.5 Since  other
people belong to this world outside of one’s own
mind, it follows that the causes for their beha-
vior need to be inferred by internal representa-
tion processing as well.  Because it is assumed
that the brain is the only mental organ (Hohwy
this collection), the location of (social) cognitive
processing thus can be said to be inside one in-
dividual’s  head.  Simulation  and  theorizing  fit
neatly into this picture of the mind; they are in-
ference processes which function to disambigu-
ate social input and are implemented by specific
neural  mechanisms.  By  contrast,  an  enactive
view of social cognition as has been described
by De Jaegher and colleagues and advocated by
Gallagher,  presupposes  two  different  assump-
tions. First, in order to assume that interaction
dynamics carry as much of the “cognitive load”
to understand other minds as is proposed, a re-
lational view of the mind enters the picture. It
is  important  to  understand  that  an  enactive
view is  not  the  same  as  an  externalist  view,
which could be compatible with assumptions of
5 Although this seems to be a rather “old” view, it is currently celebrating
a comeback. Jakob Hohwy, for example, claims that the consequences of
advocating predictive processing (2013; see also Clark 2013a) are to ad-
opt a fully internalist picture of the mind. In his words, there is an “evid-
entiary boundary” (Hohwy 2014, p. 6) between what has to be inferred
(viz., hidden causes in the external world) and the inference device (the
brain). Accordingly, all the processing takes place within this boundary,
which happens to be the skull (cf. ibid., p. 8). Please note, though, that
both Clark and Seth propose a more embodied perspective on prediction
(Clark this collection; Seth this collection).
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the cognitivist camp (cf. Rowlands 2009, p. 54).
The mind is, according to such an enactive per-
spective, neither internal nor external; it consti-
tutes itself within the relation (hence relational)
between an embodied agent and its environment
(cf. Di Paolo & Thompson 2014, p. 68; Engel et
al. 2013, p. 202). Such a view enables the claim
that interactions are examples of this unfolding
mental process and thus constitute social cogni-
tion. This claim is incompatible with an intern-
alist  perspective,  which  does  not  ascribe  any
constitutional  power  to  mind-external  proper-
ties. 
Furthermore, if the external world and the
minds  of  others  could  be  directly  perceived
without further mental processing or inference,
neither  simulation  nor  theoretical  inference
would be needed. This is exactly the point of
the non-cognitivist camp, as becomes obvious in
this quote by Newen: “The mental states of oth-
ers are not hidden, and need not to be inferred
on the basis of perceiving the behavior; rather,
behavior is an expression of the mental phenom-
ena that, in seeing the behavior, is also directly
seen” (this collection, p. 5). What does it mean
that  something  can  be  directly  seen?  Gibson
(1979) introduced DP in relation to his famous
conception of “affordances”: “The affordances of
things for an observer are specified in stimulus
information. They seem to be perceived directly
because  they  are  perceived  directly”  (Gibson
1977, p. 79). Importantly, the direct perception
of affordances is possible because, according to
Gibson,  affordances  are  physically  real  (i.e.,
they exist  independent  of  the perceiving sub-
ject) and as such are perceivable properties of
objects  in  the  environment  (cf.  1979,  p. 129).
Note how this is crucially different from a view
which assumes that object properties need to be
mentally represented, thus requiring an interme-
diary step.6 However,  Gallagher makes explicit
in a footnote (cf. 2008, p. 537) that his concep-
tion of DP is not to be entirely equated with a
Gibsonian  notion  of  the  term.  Gallagher  em-
phasizes that he does not deny the underlying
6 In the following, I will use the requirement of intermediary steps as
the distinctive feature that differentiates directness and indirectness.
In doing so, I follow De Vignemont: “There is a direct access if and
only if the causal transmission of information is direct and does not
involve intermediary steps” (2010, p. 291). 
complexity  of  perceptual  processing,  much
rather he counts those processes as belonging to
perception. He thus puts forth the conception of
“smart perception”: 
But this informing process is already built
into  the  perceptual  process  so  that  as  I
consciously  perceive,  my  perception  is
already informed by the relevant sub-per-
sonal processing. I don’t first perceive and
then add memory in order to recognize my
car. My perception, in this sense, is direct
even if the sub-personal sensory processing
that  underpins it  follows a complex and
dynamic route. (ibid., p. 537)
Even with that kind of definition, his view still
presupposes  that  there  are  properties  of  ex-
ternal objects that can be “directly” picked up,
that  exist  independently  from  the  perceiving
subject. As such, it is indeed  reminiscent of a
Gibsonian  conception.  The  difference  between
cognitivist and non-cognitivist pictures of social
cognition,  in  the  cases  that  I  just  described,
seems to boil down to the metaphysical assump-
tion of whether or not there are hidden causes
in the outside world that require an inference or
representational  mechanism in order  to access
and process them. While ST and TT clearly as-
sume such a view, DP denies  it.  Therefore,  I
claim that MV cannot simply combine theoret-
ical  elements  that  draw  on  such  considerable
metaphysical differences.
Another  important  difference  between
these theoretical approaches is how each treats
the issue of phenomenology. While the experien-
tial nature of social encounters plays at most a
minor role in mindreading theories, such as ST
and TT, the phenomenal level is of paramount
importance for the enactive camp, who advoc-
ate for DP. This becomes most obvious in the
claim that the experienced smoothness and im-
mediacy of social interactions tells us something
about the epistemic access to other minds. How-
ever, “directness” as a concept in academic re-
search is relative to a specific level of descrip-
tion. Let me explain this in more detail. Con-
sider  Gallagher’s argument that smart percep-
tion is a subpersonally informed mechanism (cf.
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2008, p. 537) that directly enables an individual
to perceive the minds of others without “addi-
tional mental effort.” It is based largely on the
rapid  activation  of  mirror  neurons  (30-100ms,
ibid., p. 541), such that he claims a distinction
between a merely perceptual process and an ad-
ditional mental process does not make sense. In
his words: 
A distinction at the neural level between
activation of the visual cortex and activa-
tion  of  the  pre-motor  cortex  does  not
mean  that  this  constitutes  a  distinction
between processes that are purely percep-
tual and processes that involve something
more than perception. (ibid., p. 541)
The question that follows is how one should in-
dividuate  mental  mechanisms,  and  I  suggest
that  functional properties are much more sub-
stantial and conceptually relevant individuation
criteria than temporal properties. It is, to me,
highly  questionable  whether  temporal  correla-
tion justifies assuming that there is mechanistic
inseparability. The functional role of a mental
mechanism  seems  a  much  less  arbitrary  cri-
terion.  Furthermore,  it  enables  a  more  fine-
grained view of the subpersonal processes that
underlie  social  cognition.  Instead  of  talking
about perception—which could include all pro-
cesses if only they are activated in a more or
less specific  amount of  time—it is  possible  to
take a closer look at which brain region correl-
ates with which mechanism. If mechanisms are
individuated by their  functional role instead of
the temporal properties of the physical realizers
of this functional role, it makes sense to assume
that the visual system and the mirror neuron
system are distinct. If they are, however, it is
unfeasible to speak of “smart perception”. This
concept presupposes that perceptual and post-
perceptual  processes  can  coherently  be  de-
scribed as one mechanism, which I reject. Addi-
tionally, the concept of “direct perception” does
not apply anymore either, since mirror mechan-
isms should be seen as a functionally distinct
and therefore intermediary step in the process
of  understanding  others.  I  thus conclude  that
DP—as described  by Gallagher—does  not  co-
herently apply to the subpersonal level of de-
scription. 
This  relates  to  my  main  point,  namely
that there are different levels of description at
which a phenomenon can be scrutinized. At the
phenomenological level, DP can be described as
the experience of  directly  and immediately  per-
ceiving the other person’s mental states. I walk
into my living room, I see my friend’s face and I
experience  myself  as  instantaneously  knowing
that she is really upset. However, this experien-
tial quality of directness is brought forth by a
subpersonal process, which is indirect, as I have
argued above. At any other level of description,
therefore,  directness  does  not  apply.  In  this
view, DP is a phenomenal quality of some men-
tal states and should thus not be confused with
the epistemic  mechanism  itself.  The simultan-
eity in our everyday experience does not justify
anything on other levels of description. I there-
fore argue that DP should be treated as a phe-
nomenal quality of  some social  encounters  in-
stead of assigning it the status of an epistemic
strategy to access other minds.
Note that Newen does not explicitly sup-
port a phenomenological or enactive view of the
mind, nor does he make any claims about the
metaphysics of social cognition. What he does
do,  however,  is  emphasize  Gallagher’s  concep-
tion of DP and primary interaction as being the
main sources  for an epistemic access to other
minds (cf. Newen this collection, p. 8). If Newen
was to reject the strong claims of a non-repres-
entational view of (social) cognition, however, it
is  questionable how closely his notions of  DP
and primary interaction, as core concepts of his
theory, actually relate to their original formula-
tions. This leaves us with two options. The first
is  to  assume  that  Newen  fully  endorses  the
views of his oft-cited colleague. In this case, the
problem of compatibility becomes obvious. The
second, and more likely possibility is that the
author does not support DP and primary inter-
action with all their metaphysical implications.
It  indeed  seems  that  he  rather  re-formulates
both concepts so that they possibly fit into a
representational  framework.  According  to
Newen (this collection, p.5), DP is realized by a
process of pattern recognition and primary in-
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teraction  –  although  Newen  explicitly  cites
Gallagher & Hutto (2008) – is characterized as
follows: “[…] I notice a social act being directed
towards me and so start to interact, such that a
standard interaction is realized, which may be
nonlinguistic  but  may  also  involve  linguistic
communication […]”  (Newen this  collection,  p.
7). What is problematic here is that one of the
most  interesting  and valuable  features  of  MV
gets lost, namely its potential to fulfill demands
of the interactive turn. A true fulfillment would
require widening the theoretical scope of social
cognition  by going  beyond the  study of  indi-
vidual brains and considering bodily, interactive
and phenomenological processes more carefully.
What  needs  to  be  reconciled  and  made
conceptually consistent is thus our choice of a
specific, unified methodological framework—our
overarching theoretical approach of simulation,
theory-based inference, DP and primary interac-
tion—since they all describe important aspects
of social understanding. It should be a common
aim to work with a coherent set of metaphysical
assumptions, since whether or not one agrees on
either  set  of  background assumptions  has im-
portant  implications  for  both  theoretical  and
empirical research. Not only does that decision
influence our choice of the unit of analysis, i.e.,
how we frame the explanatory unit for empirical
research. For a long time, this unit has been one
individual  observing  another.  It  has  been
claimed,  however,  that  this  does not properly
reflect the real nature of social cognition, and
thus a shift is needed: 
The explanatory unit of social interaction
is  not  the  brain,  or  even two (or  more)
brains, but a dynamic relation between or-
ganisms,  which  include  brains,  but  also
their  own structural  features  that enable
specific  perception-action  loops  involving
social and physical environments, which in
turn  affect  statistical  regularities  that
shape the structure of the nervous system
[…]. (Gallagher et al. 2013, p. 422) 
When  an  enactive  or  phenomenological  per-
spective is adopted and the status of interaction
as constituting social cognition is accepted, this
adds an additional level of analysis (i.e., an “in-
teractionist  stance”;  De  Jaegher et  al. 2010)
while erasing one that is profound and funda-
mental  for  most  researchers:  representation.
Furthermore, the shared goal to pay more at-
tention to the body, interaction and phenomen-
ology  comes  with  many  methodological  chal-
lenges. For all these reasons it should be in the
common interest of the research field to find a
way to ease the tensions.
As I have shown, Newen tries to combine
four elements that might not be entirely com-
patible. However, the core of his idea is highly
valuable, and certainly should not be rejected.
What his pluralistic account of social cognition
claims is that there are low-level social mechan-
isms that mainly rely on interaction and do not
need complex or explicit thought, while higher-
level,  sophisticated mechanisms play a just as
important role for the phenomenon. While some
social  situations  require  processes  that  allow
complex thinking, other contexts can be intuit-
ively  disambiguated.  In  what  follows,  I  will
sketch an alternative framework, based on Met-
zinger’s theory of three-level embodiment, which
I claim is  able  to integrate the four elements
while  operating  on  coherent  background  as-
sumptions. Additionally, it has the potential to
fulfill  the  demands of  the  interactive  turn by
paying  more attention to interactive contexts,
the role of the body and the importance of phe-
nomenology.
4 1-3E – First-order embodiment, 
second-order embodiment, third-order 
embodiment 
Before I describe how the framework of 1-3E it-
self can be exploited for a pluralistic picture of
social cognition, let me describe the framework
in more detail. Metzinger’s goal is to provide a
framework which shows how the experience of
being  a self  is  generated  within  an embodied
system (cf.  Metzinger 2014, p. 272). The basic
assumption  is  that  experiential  phenomena
(such as phenomenal selfhood) can be described
at several different levels: they have a specific
phenomenal quality (i.e., phenomenological level
of description), which is brought forth by under-
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lying  computations  and  representations  (i.e.,
computational/representational level of descrip-
tion). These are implemented by their physical
counterparts (i.e., implementational level of de-
scription). 1-3E is a theory about the grounding
relations between them, that is, the grounding
relations  holding  between phenomenal  proper-
ties of representational states and their physical
and computational resources. In a broader con-
text,  Metzinger claims that “the self” is not a
thing or an entity (2004), but rather the phe-
nomenal  product  of  a  complex  computational
process which happens to take place in embod-
ied systems. If that is the case, however, the fol-
lowing question arises: How exactly is the ex-
perience of being a self generated within an em-
bodied system? In other  words,  what are the
grounding relations of phenomenal selfhood?7
Metzinger introduces three levels: first-or-
der embodiment, second-order embodiment and
third-order embodiment (Metzinger 2006, 2014).
Importantly,  these  concepts  not  only  describe
different levels of embodiment and their relation
within  one system, they also refer to different
classes of systems which possess different kinds
of embodiment. To see this, think of the follow-
ing three systems which all possess a body and
some sort of skillful behavior: a worm, an ad-
vanced robot (e.g., the “starfish”, see Metzinger
2007), and a human in a waking state. As for
the worm, it is safe to say that, in order to nav-
igate  its  environment,  it  directly  exploits  its
physical (i.e., bodily) resources. It is highly un-
likely,  however,  that one would find any rule-
based computation over an explicit symbol-like
representational structure in the worm’s nervous
system. In Metzinger’s terms, this kind of sys-
tem possesses first-order embodiment (1E sys-
tem).  In  contrast  to  this  rather  rudimentary
kind of embodiment, 2E systems (i.e., systems
which possess second-order embodiment) do un-
consciously  represent  themselves  as embodied.
This means that they have some kind of body
model that can be exploited by the system in
7 “It is the problem of describing the abstract computational principles
as well as the implementational mechanics by which a system’s phe-
nomenal self-model (PSM; cf.  Metzinger 2003,  2007) is anchored in
low-level physical dynamics, in a maximally parsimonious way, and
without assuming a single, central module for global self-representa-
tion.” (Metzinger 2014, p. 272)
several ways (e.g., as a functional tool for motor
control) and sustains skillful interaction with the
environment.  Importantly,  2E  enables  counter-
factual representation, i.e., the ability to repres-
ent possible states without actual execution. The
body  model  thus  functionally  underlies  both
physical  and  virtual  behavior  (see  Cruse &
Schilling this collection). What 2E systems are
lacking, however, is a phenomenal representation
of themselves as embodied systems. While a ro-
bot like the starfish can use its unconscious body
representation to steer movements,  it does not
experience itself as doing so. Only systems that
possess third-order embodiment (3E systems) ex-
perience  this  phenomenal  quality  of  being  an
agent that owns a body. Humans in non-patholo-
gical  waking  states,  for  example,  possess  this
kind of embodiment. Along with the ability to
use their body model in the same way as 2E sys-
tems do, they have the additional sense of own-
ing  and  controlling  this  model  (cf.  Metzinger
2014, pp. 274–275). Interestingly, it is also here
that we once again find the phenomenology of
“directness” and “immediacy”. It is important to
note  that  2E  and  3E  systems  always  possess
lower levels of embodiment as well,  since they
build onto each other and higher levels presup-
pose the existence of lower levels. In this way, 1-
3E can be seen as a grounding theory. To briefly
summarize, systems that phenomenally represent
themselves as embodied agents possess 3E. Phe-
nomenal properties of  states,  described at this
level, are computationally grounded by referring
to a unified representation of the body – second-
order  embodiment.  This  unconscious  body
model, in turn, is grounded in physical and bod-
ily resources, which are described at the lowest
level of the hierarchy.8 
Metzinger is  clear  about  the  relation
between 2E and 3E; the representational content
8 I have argued before that a simple combination of cognitivist, repres-
entational, and enactive, non-representational perspectives results in
a metaphysically incoherent view. One could ask why it should now
be possible for 1-3E to put together non-representational and repres-
entational levels of description. As I have described earlier, most en-
active theories reject representations entirely (e.g., Fuchs & Jaegher
2009, p. 466). That is one important reason why such a view is in-
compatible with representational theories. Grounding theories, how-
ever, take a different perspective on representations. They view them
as  grounded in bodily processes (cf.  Pezzulo et al. 2013, pp. 6). As
such, representations can be seen as a phenomenon that gradually
emerges within an embodied system (cf. Metzinger 2014, p. 278).
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of 2E is “elevated to the level of global availability
and  integrated  with  a  single  spatial  situation
model plus a virtual window of presence” (2014,
p. 274). However, one thing that remains relat-
ively vague in his theory is the relation between
1E and 2E. The problem I see here is that Met-
zinger does not explicitly describe what actually
grounds 2E and which role bodily structures play
besides that of yielding a grounding relation.9 A
1E system is defined as a “purely physical, react-
ive system”, which adapts to its environment by
exploiting its physical resources. This is not, in
my view, what is being represented by a 2E sys-
tem,  which  represents  itself  “as  an  embodied
agent” (ibid., p. 273). What is needed is a more
detailed and specific description of 1E and its re-
lation to 2E. Therefore, the discussion of 1E in
my own proposal is twofold. First, I analyze the
low-level  mechanisms  that  can  be  described  at
this level, claiming that they enable basic social
skills  (e.g.,  coupling).  Second,  I  describe  which
neural,  bodily  and  perhaps  even  extra-bodily
structures  most  likely  underlie  social  processes
that are located at the level of 2sE. 
There is one important aspect of 3E that I
wish to describe in more detail as it will be cru-
cial  for my theory. Metzinger  distinguishes two
kinds  of  phenomenal  properties  instantiated by
conscious  representational  states;  they  can  be
either transparent or opaque. Notice that he uses
those terms in a rather counterintuitive way I will
try to make sense of in the following.10 An ana-
logy that might help to do so is to think of the
difference between a freshly cleaned and a quite
dirty window front. In the first case, when the
glass is transparent, we can see everything behind
it while not perceiving the glass as a medium we
are looking through. However, if the glass is dirty
and opaque, we will not only have trouble seeing
the things behind it,  we will  also  perceive the
window  itself  as  something  we  are  looking
through.11 In analogy, consider mental states (and
9 He gives, though, an example of phenomenal dream states, showing how
(parts of) the body model is grounded in bodily structures and pro-
cesses. Physical eye movements, in this case, most likely ground the phe-
nomenal experience in lucid dreaming (cf. Metzinger 2014, p. 276).
10 For a more detailed description of former usage of the terms, see
Metzinger 2003, pp. 345–358.
11 Metzinger uses  a  similar  example:  “With  regard  to  the  phe-
nomenology of  visual  experience transparency means that  we
are  not  able  to  see  something,  because  it  is  transparent.  We
their processing stages) as either transparent or
opaque. A mental state is opaque when it is ex-
perienced  as a  representational  state.  A  quite
straightforward example is explicit thought where
an individual is consciously aware of the fact that
she is thinking. The process of representation  is
represented as such in this case, and is therefore
opaque.  In  contrast,  if  a  state  is  transparent,
earlier  processing  stages  are  not  phenomenally
represented; they are not part of the experience of
an individual. In the case of phenomenal selfhood,
for example, all that is experienced is the sense of
being a self in a world. The fact that this experi-
ence is a representational process is not part of its
phenomenal  content.  Note  that  the  distinction
between  phenomenal  properties  of  epistemic
mechanisms (such as computations and represent-
ations) and epistemic mechanisms themselves is
central to the concept of transparency. If we do
not experience that a specific phenomenal state is
generated  subpersonally,  when  the  underlying
processes are not elevated to the level of experi-
ence,  all  we  experience  is  the  subjective,  phe-
nomenological profile of that state. Such a claim
is only valid, however, if we assume that these
two levels are actually distinct, which seems to be
denied by some philosophers in the phenomenolo-
gical tradition. 
In what follows, I will modify parts of the
1-3E framework in order to make it suitable for
a pluralistic view of social understanding. The
basic scaffold of the theory is retained, since its
hierarchical structure is helpful for describing a
multi-facetted phenomenon like social cognition.
It also offers the possibility for future research
to pair 1-3E and 1-3sE with other hierarchical
theories of cognition, such as the predictive pro-
cessing  framework  (PP;  Clark 2013b;  Hohwy
2013). PP has not only been described as a very
promising  theory  to  unify  perception,  action
and cognition (Clark 2013b), it has also been
fruitfully applied to social cognition (Kilner et
al. 2007). 1-3sE has the potential to integrate
this explanatorily powerful approach, the details
of which can be spelled out in future research,
but cannot be pursued in  this  commentary.  I
furthermore adopt the idea that different levels
don’t  see  the  window,  but  only  the  bird  flying  by.”  (2003,
p. 358)
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of  embodiment  represent  different  levels  of
sophistication and complexity in a system. In
order  to  strengthen  this  idea  and  to  give  an
even more differentiated view of  social  under-
standing, I aim to make the difference between
transparent and opaque social states more obvi-
ous.  While  the  general  distinction  between
transparency  and  opacity  is  retained,  I  will
modify this aspect in order to make it fruitful
for social understanding. To do so, I introduce
the concept of “3sE+”, which describes experi-
ences in social situations that need explicit and
conscious thinking. 
Transparency  makes  it  furthermore  pos-
sible,  according  to  Metzinger,  to  distinguish
one’s own body from that of others (cf.  Met-
zinger 2014, p. 274). However, there is an objec-
tion I wish to make about this point. I claim
that  a  self-other  distinction  that  functionally
serves to identify one’s own body in contrast to
those of others is already present at the level of
2sE and thus can be achieved without phenom-
enally representing one’s body. I will argue for
this claim in more detail in the next section.
Additionally,  my  proposal  offers  novel
ways to enrich Metzinger’s original account. He
claims that the functional structure of the body
model opens a window into social cognition (cf.
ibid., p. 273). However, I suggest that this could
be a bidirectional relation. There are hints in
the literature that being immersed in a social
environment is crucial and formative for more
general cognitive skills and their development.
For  example,  anecdotal  evidence  shows  that
emotional neglect of caregivers severely impairs
the physical and mental development of children
(Zimmer 1989). Empirical research furthermore
shows that the presence, interaction, perception
and emotional engagement of and with others
shape  self-related  body  representations  (e.g.,
Furlanetto et al. 2013;  Schilbach et al. 2013).
Longo & Tsakiris (2013) thus conclude that this
line  of  research  suggests  a  strong  connection
between first-person and so-called second-person
(Schilbach et al. 2013) processes, which needs to
be  considered  by  researchers  of  each  camp:
“Such findings support a model of first-person
perspective according to which our sense of self
is plastically affected by multisensory informa-
tion as it becomes available during self-other in-
teractions” (Longo &  Tsakiris 2013, p. 430).  I
thus conclude that it should not only be con-
sidered how the development of a self-model in-
fluences social cognition, but also which role so-
cial processes play in forming such a self-model.
This opens interesting and new questions for re-
search  on  both  social  cognition  and  the  self.
One could ask, for example, whether some so-
cial cognitive skills are necessary for the devel-
opment of a stable self-model or whether there
are “genuinely social” parts of the self-model. 
5 1-3sE– Levels of social embodiment
In this section, I will introduce an alternative
framework  in  which  I  describe  different  pro-
cessing stages of social understanding as differ-
ent levels of social embodiment. Before I go into
detail about how to apply 1-3E to social under-
standing, let me motivate my strategy here. I
have already pointed out why MV yields an at-
tractive theoretical assumption for research on
social cognition. It allows, to briefly repeat, the
integration  of  different  aspects  of  a  manifold
phenomenon and thus aims to give a compre-
hensive perspective  that  is  able  to encompass
sub-areas of interest and research. The advant-
age of couching MV into 1-3E is that its hier-
archical nature affords this integration at differ-
ent levels of description, while operating on a
set of coherent background assumptions. As a
grounding  theory,  it  suggests  how  different
levels of analysis relate and at the least has the
potential to assign an important role to aspects
that lay outside an individual brain. As such it
can also do justice to demands from the inter-
active turn, viz. the consideration of interaction
dynamics and their possible role for social cog-
nition as well as taking the phenomenology of
social encounters seriously. However, MV suffers
from the problem of metaphysical incompatibil-
ity.  1-3E,  on the other hand, is  a representa-
tional  account  that  offers  a  metaphysically
sound ground for a manifold phenomenon. My
goal is to scaffold a framework for human social
cognition,  which,  as  I  will  argue,  can  be  de-
scribed as a case of 3E in non-pathological hu-
man individuals. 
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I will now briefly give a rough overview of
my proposal of a three-level model of social un-
derstanding which I dub “1-3sE” (first-order so-
cial  embodiment,  second-order  social  embodi-
ment, third-order social embodiment)12, before I
go into detail about what each level amounts to.
As in the original version of the framework, levels
of social embodiment represent both levels within
a system and different kinds of systems. I thus as-
sume  that  each  social  third-order  system  pos-
sesses first- and second-order social embodiment,
too. In this commentary, I will focus on describing
levels of embodiment within social systems, since
this aspect of the framework is of greater import-
ance for a pluralistic view of social cognition. 
As previously mentioned, I take it that 1sE
fulfills a twofold function: First, it serves as the
implementational  level  of  description,  showing
which physical parts ground higher-level, repres-
entational  and  phenomenal  processes.  Second,
low-level sensorimotor mechanisms subserve basic
social interactions (e.g., coupling or synchroniza-
tion). 2sE involves the instantiation of a model
which  pre-reflexively  represents  features  of  the
body. It is assumed that parts of this body model
can be shared and thus functionally underlie so-
cial cognitive processes that may well operate at
the unconscious level, such as imitation, joint at-
tention and action understanding. Finally, 3sE de-
scribes cases of consciously experienced social un-
derstanding. I claim that there are various kinds
of  phenomenal  experiences  in  social  situations
that can be differentiated by applying the con-
cepts of transparency and opacity. Since I con-
sider opaque social mental states to exhibit a very
special kind of experience, which is not only rare,
but might also entail an additional level of repres-
entation, I introduce an extra level: 3sE+. I will
now describe the specific levels and their relation
in more detail, before I show how my view over-
comes the shortcomings of MV.
5.1 Third-order social embodiment (3sE)
Individuals that phenomenally represent them-
selves as social individuals can be described as
12 Note that Schilling and Cruse have already used the abbreviation “1-
3SE” to describe levels of situated embodiment. I thus chose a lower case
“s” to emphasize the difference (cf. Schilling & Cruse 2008, p. 72).
social  3E  systems  (3sE).  There  are  certainly
many different  ways in  which humans experi-
ence themselves as being social, but I will focus
on  those  that  are  mentioned  by  Newen:  DP,
personal-level  simulation,  and explicit  theoret-
ical inference. 
The concepts of transparency and opacity
allow a more fine-grained distinction of different
phenomenal experiences of social encounters, as
they offer a way to emphasize the similarities and
differences between various phenomenal qualities
in social situations. DP describes the experience
that I can, without being aware of any intermedi-
ary  steps,  understand  another  person.  Import-
antly, as Zahavi points out, the perceived direct-
ness still  holds in cases of “unsuccessful” social
understanding,  such  as  deception  or  misunder-
standings (cf. 2011, pp. 548–549). Although I can
get what you say completely wrong, for example,
I would still experience myself as immediately un-
derstanding  what  you  are  saying.13 Since,  as  I
have discussed earlier, the experiential nature of a
mental state is not to be equated with its epi-
stemic complexity, we can assume that DP oper-
ates  on  several  subpersonal  mechanisms.  These
are, however, not explicitly represented. Hence it
makes  sense  to  describe  DP as  resulting  from
transparent social cognitive states. By doing so, it
is possible to keep its phenomenal status as im-
mediate and direct, while not equating this qual-
ity with its epistemic status. In contrast, theoriz-
ing and personal-level simulation have a quite dif-
ferent phenomenal characteristic. In these cases,
the  process  of  constructing a  specific  insight
about the other is part of the experience, may
this be by explicitly simulating the person (e.g.,
“If I was her, what would make me excited about
having a cat?”), or through theoretical inference
(e.g., “People usually own cats to feel less alone,
maybe she is excited to have a furry companion
now”).  They  can  thus  be  said  to  result  from
opaque social cognitive states. What distinguishes
transparent from opaque states is the degree to
which one’s own social cognitive processing, which
is directed at the other person, is explicitly rep-
resented as a process. 
13 “There is, so to speak, nothing that gets in the way, and it is not as if I
am first directed at an intermediary, something different from the state,
and then only in a secondary step target it.” (Zahavi 2011, p. 548).
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However, as already mentioned, I see the
need to modify Metzinger’s conception of 3E in
order  to  reflect  a  proper  distinction  between
transparent  and  opaque  social  states.  I  claim
that opaque states exhibit an additional level of
representation, since the representation process
itself is part of the phenomenal experience. In
order  to emphasize that this  is  a  special  and
probably rare phenomenon, I introduce the level
of “3sE+”. Both transparent and opaque social
states are certainly to be located at the third
level  of  embodiment,  since  they  possess  phe-
nomenal properties. Metzinger suggests that the
distinctive  feature  of  3E  in  contrast  to  lower
levels is that it enables the system to identify it-
self with its body (cf.  Metzinger 2014, p. 274).
The  resulting  phenomenal  properties  of  self-
identification and selfhood stem from the exper-
ienced immediacy that comes with transparency
(cf.  ibid., p. 273). If this is the case, it can be
assumed that phenomenal states are not  either
transparent or opaque, but that transparency is
part  of  any phenomenal  state.  The degree  to
which  the  representation  process  is  explicitly
represented varies, transparency and opacity are
thus gradually arising properties (cf.  Metzinger
2003, p. 358). Additionally, it could well be that
there is a constant oscillation between transpar-
ency and opacity, depending – for example – on
specific contexts and situations. However, opa-
city and the resulting experiences seem to be
more high-level features that can only be found
in a small subgroup of species. This is obvious
in social understanding, since full-fledged theor-
etical  inference  and  high-level  simulation  are
not very likely to be found in most non-human
animals and human infants. It seems that in the
case of opaque states there is an additional level
of representation that requires a higher level of
sophistication, which should be made more ex-
plicit in the hierarchical framework. Transpar-
ent and opaque mental states – at least in this
case for social understanding – reflect two dif-
ferent  kinds  of  phenomenal  experiences  that
might  also  have  different  underlying  mechan-
isms. I thus introduce, in order to do justice to
this  difference,  an  additional  level  of  3sE,
namely 3sE+. 3sE+ describes those phenomenal
states  during  which  one  is  aware  of  the  con-
structing process and which occurs in situations
that require this kind of reasoning in order to
disambiguate the input. This additional distinc-
tion at the level of 3sE enables a more detailed
view  and  underlines  the  difference  between
transparency and opacity. 
One question that arises at this point is the
following. We have assumed that opacity means
to phenomenally represent (parts of) the actual
process of representation. Does that mean that in
the case of theorizing and simulation one would
find their underlying representational processes to
be subpersonal kinds of theoretical inference and
simulation?  There  are  two  points  that  speak
against this assumption. First, there are justified
worries that the conception of implicit theorizing
as an unconscious process stretches the concept of
a theory too far (e.g., Blackburn 1992). These ar-
guments against TT have been presented extens-
ively in the literature and I will thus not repeat
them here. In the case of simulation, secondly, it
seems  that  subpersonal  or  low-level  simulation
does not necessarily generate the phenomenal ex-
perience of simulating. Consider the many studies
that have been conducted to explore whether the
activity of the mirror neuron system can be seen
as a kind of implicit simulation that enables social
understanding (for a review, see for example Cat-
taneo & Rizzolatti 2009). In most of these experi-
ments that found mirror  neuron activity to be
correlated  with  social  understanding,  it  seems
that the phenomenal experience has the character
of DP rather than explicit simulation.14 Such a
view, as I hope to have shown, has two advant-
ages. It describes different kinds of phenomenal
experiences in social encounters and distinguishes
them by referring to the concepts of transparency
and opacity. 
5.2 Second-order social embodiment 
(2sE)
Assuming that there is something like a repres-
entational body model, we can now ask which
14 Note that this is a speculative claim, since almost none of the studies
contain phenomenological reports. It could be fruitful, however, for
future research to pay more attention to the experience that parti-
cipants have in a specific experimental setting. This would help to
understand which kind of epistemic mechanism generates which kind
of experience. 
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parts of it can be exploited for social cognition.
In  order  to  do so,  let  me briefly  recapitulate
how to conceive of this body model. It has been
described  as  a  “grounded,  predictive  body
model that continuously filters data in accord-
ance with geometrical, kinematic and dynamic
boundary conditions” (Metzinger 2014, p. 273).
Furthermore,  Metzinger  predicts  that  parts  of
this model can be shared by individuals: “[…] on
a  certain  level  of  functional  granularity,  this
type  of  core  representation  [i.e.,  the  body
model] might also describe the generic, univer-
sal geometry which is shared by all members of
a  biological  species”  (ibid.,  p. 273;  see  also
Schilling & Cruse 2012). Together with Gallese
he argues elsewhere that the mirror neuron sys-
tem plays a crucial role in generating a basis for
both an “internal model of reality” as well as a
“shared action ontology” (Metzinger &  Gallese
2003, p. 550). This means, as I take it, that the
body model  contains  information  that  repres-
ents one’s own body, but is not completely self-
specific. To see this, consider that in order to be
shared, representations must not be too specific
as to not generalize to the bodies of others. I
will  come back to  this  point  soon.  This  con-
sequence worried  Newen, leading him to reject
the view that mirror neurons form a basis for
social cognition: 
Why are mirror neurons not an essential
part of understanding others? They repres-
ent a type of action or emotion that is in-
dependent  from  a  first-  or  third-person
perspective;  but  the  distinction  between
self and other is an essential part of under-
standing others (this collection, p. 4). 
This raises the question of what exactly it
is that can be shared by individuals. Since these
considerations are central to the possibility of
exploiting  the  body  model  for  social  under-
standing,  I  now aim to refute  the worry and
give a possible answer to the question. 
Mirror neurons were discovered in the pre-
motor cortex of macaque monkeys more than 20
years ago. They fire, as is famously known, both
when an individual executes and observes an ac-
tion (Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1996;
Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). Although there is
considerable  controversy  about  their  existence
in humans (Hickok 2009), their actual function
(Jacob 2008),  and  their  explanatory  power
(Borg 2007), they are considered by many re-
searchers to form one of the crucial systems for
understanding others (e.g.,  Stanley &  Adolphs
2013, p. 512). Mirror neurons are indeed neutral
to the agent of an action – they fire whether an
action is executed by oneself or another person.
Insofar, critics are right to say that it is not ob-
vious how they could provide the important dis-
tinction  between  self  and  other.  However,  it
seems that  there  are two important  facts  left
out in this line of thinking. Firstly, it has been
suggested that there are inhibition mechanisms
that  “control”  shared  representations  and
provide the basis for a self-other distinction (for
a  more  detailed  discussion,  see  Brass et  al.
2009).  Secondly,  mirror  neurons  have  always
been presented as being embedded in a  system
(hence mirror neuron system, e.g.,  Cattaneo &
Rizzolatti 2009;  Iacoboni &  Dapretto 2006;
Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). This system con-
sists of areas which contain mirror neurons, but
also regions which contain neurons that do not
have bimodal properties and encode only self-
generated actions, as described by Jeannerod &
Pacherie (cf.  2004,  pp. 131–132).15 Thus,  it  is
correct that mirror neurons alone do not distin-
guish between self and other. However, this is a
rather  impoverished  view,  since  they  should
never  be  considered  in  isolation.  A  similar
thought which helps to refute the worry is given
by  De  Vignemont who  adopts  the  view  that
mirroring can be seen as sharing body repres-
15 “The problem of agent-identification, however, is solved by the fact
that other premotor neurons (the canonical neurons) and, presum-
ably many other neuron populations as well, fire only when the mon-
key performs the action and not when it observes it performed by
another agent. This is indeed another critical feature of the shared
representations  concept:  they overlap only partially,  and the non-
overlapping part of a given representation can be the cue for attrib-
uting the action to the self or to the other. The same mechanism op-
erates  in humans.  Neuroimaging experiments  where  brain activity
was compared during different types of simulated actions (e.g., in-
tending actions and preparing for execution, imagining actions, ob-
serving actions performed by other people) revealed, first, that there
exists a cortical network common to all conditions, to which the in-
ferior parietal lobule (areas 39 and 40), the ventral premotor area
(ventral area 6), and part of SMA contribute; and second, that mo-
tor representations for each individual condition are clearly specified
by the activation of cortical zones which do not overlap between con-
ditions […].” (Jeannerod & Pacherie 2004, pp. 131–132)
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entations (2014a). She argues that shared body
representations do not threaten a self-other dis-
tinction because  they always  contain informa-
tion that is too self-specific to be shared. They
are, in her words, “[…] Janus-faced. They face
inward  as  representations  of  one’s  body  and
they face  outward as  representations  of  other
people’s bodies” (De Vignemont 2014b, p. 135).
A closer look at her conception also yields
a possible answer to the question of what it is
that can be shared with others. De Vignemont
argues that it must be a rather coarse-grained
representation of one’s body, since bodies differ
considerably in many aspects like size, gender,
posture  etc.  This  representation,  which  De
Vignemont  dubs  the  “body  map”  (De
Vignemont 2014a,  p. 289,  2014b,  p. 134),  con-
tains information about the basic configuration
of body parts and thus serves as a functional
tool to localize bodily experiences. Irrespective
of individual differences of this map, some of its
content  is  so  coarse-grained  that  humans  are
still able to imitate others or experience vicari-
ous bodily sensations, both of which have been
claimed  to  draw  on  shared  body  representa-
tions.  In  other  words,  what  can be  shared is
that  part  of  the  body  map  whose  content  is
general enough to apply to all kinds of bodies,
no matter their differences. 
Although this is surely no exhaustive in-
quiry of the matter, these thoughts provide an
idea of how to view 2sE as enabling social cog-
nition:  at the representational  level,  there are
parts of the body model which can be shared
with others.16 These parts, however, have to be
embedded in a system that also contains self-
specific information. Otherwise it would be im-
possible to attribute an action, an experience or
observation to the agent concerned. It now be-
comes obvious why I claimed earlier that a self-
other distinction does not need a  phenomenal
representation of  one’s  body.  The unconscious
body model and its shared parts seem well fur-
nished to provide such a distinction and thus
make unconscious social processes such as mim-
icry and involuntary imitation possible. 
16 Sharing means that representational content overlaps, at least par-
tially. For a more detailed discussion on sharing, see De Vignemont
2014b; Jeannerod & Pacherie 2004.
5.3 First-order social embodiment (1sE)
Although interaction  is  certainly  a  topic  that
has been the least explored by researchers of so-
cial  cognition,  it  nevertheless  should  be  con-
sidered  carefully  by  any  theory  that  aims  to
provide a comprehensive view on social under-
standing.  Including  interaction  is  particularly
challenging, since most attempts to do so came
from proponents of an enactive perspective on
the mind. However, I have argued that a plural-
istic  model  of  social  cognition  cannot  simply
combine enactive claims with cognitive ones (see
section 3 “Multiplicity needs coherence”). What
is needed is an approach of social understanding
that  integrates  interaction  as  a  phenomenon
that most probably does not need explicit, high-
level  representation.  1sE  offers  a  way  to  de-
scribe such low-level social processes. Knoblich
and Sebanz, for example, review several cases of
“social coupling”. Individuals tend to synchron-
ize their movements if they are sitting next to
each other in a rocking chair (cf.  Knoblich &
Sebanz 2008,  p. 2022),  a  process  which  can
plausibly  be  described  without  representation.
This sort of “entrainment” (ibid., p. 2023) is a
case of coupling during which individuals influ-
ence each other’s behavior without consciously
intending to do so. There are also cases in the
animal kingdom that can be described at the
level  of  1sE,  such  as  the  formation  and  syn-
chronization of fireflies (Suda et al. 2006). 
The next step is to depict the implementa-
tion of  specifically  “social  parts”  of  the body
model.  What  physically  grounds  them  is  de-
scribed at the level of 1sE. One buzzword in the
research field of social cognitive neuroscience is
“the  social  brain”  (e.g.,  Dunbar 1998;
Gazzaniga 1985). This term refers to all the dif-
ferent areas in the brain that have been found
to be correlated to cognitive processing in social
situations,  including,  of  course,  the  mirror
neuron system. While the investigation of brain
regions and their functions for social cognition
is a well-established endeavor, it will be more
interesting to look at other possibilities of im-
plementing social cognition. The role of interac-
tion for social cognition, for example, has been
hotly disputed in the research field. As I have il-
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lustrated  earlier,  some  claim  that  interaction
dynamics could constitute social cognitive mech-
anisms (De Jaegher et al. 2010). However, such
a view is only sustainable in a radically enactive
set of assumptions and as such is not an option
for the framework I am suggesting here. What
should be considered, though, is whether being
in  an  interaction  is  necessary  for  some social
cognitive states. It has been suggested by recent
studies that activation patterns differ depending
on  the  situational  context  and  the  degree  of
emotional  engagement  in  a  social  situation
(Schilbach et al. 2013). These results point to
this possibility, but it still  needs more careful
investigation  whether  or  not  they  justify  the
claim  that  interaction  in  any  way  physically
grounds or enables social cognition. 
Such basic and non-representational forms
of social understanding have been neglected by
the research field for a long time and are in need
of more empirical and philosophical investigation.
Especially research on joint action and coupled
systems is therefore important to sort out 1sE.
6 Conclusion
My first goal in this commentary was to show
that MV as a pluralistic view on social under-
standing is a valuable contribution to the in-
teractive turn.  It  has the potential  to  integ-
rate insights  from different  directions of  em-
pirical  and  theoretical  research  and  thus  to
yield a comprehensive account on social cogni-
tion. However, I argued that such an approach
needs  careful  consideration  concerning  its
metaphysical  background  assumptions.  I
demonstrated that parts of MV as laid out by
Newen  are  not  fully  compatible  and  that  it
thus  needs  a  different  kind  of  framework
which allows a coherent picture. 
I presented an alternative model by ap-
plying Metzinger’s framework of 1-3E to social
cognition,  hence  1-3sE.  Although  the  details
are still to be spelled out in future research, 1-
3sE has several advantages that enable a co-
herent  and fruitful  framing of  MV. It  integ-
rates all four social mechanisms mentioned by
Newen and thus can be seen as a pluralistic
account of social cognition. What is different,
however,  is  that  those  four  elements are  de-
scribed  at  different  levels  of  description.  As
such they all play a specific role in the overall
image of social understanding and merge into
a manifold, but unified picture. Basic interac-
tion,  in  this  theory,  can  be  accounted  for
without making radical claims in either direc-
tion; we do not need to assume that the mind
is relational, as claimed by proponents of the
enactive theory. However, we also do not have
to ascribe a high level of sophistication to a
system in order to be able to interact. In my
proposal, interaction (or at least simple inter-
active mechanisms) can function without any
complex  representation.  Interaction  is  thus
located  at  the  lowest  level  of  the  hierarchy,
namely 1sE. The next level of social embodi-
ment describes representational and computa-
tional processes that subserve social cognition.
I showed in which ways a model of one’s own
body could enable social cognition and which
parts of such a model could possibly be shared
with others. 2sE encompasses these processes.
I further argued that DP should be treated as
a  phenomenological  rather  than  epistemolo-
gical concept and should thus be described at
the level of 3sE. By doing so, I aimed to avoid
mixing  up different  levels  of  description and
to yield a coherent usage of the term. High-
level simulation and theoretical inference have
been  described  at  the  level  of  3sE+,  the
highest  level  of  the  hierarchy,  thus  doing
justice to the fact that they are very special
and  probably  rare  cases  of  social  cognition.
The application of the notions of transparency
and  opacity  offered  a  way to  emphasize  the
phenomenological variety that comes with dif-
ferent social situations. 
There are still many open questions and this
is by no means an exhaustive description of how
1-3sE can be used to frame social understanding.
My goal here was to highlight  its potential  to
provide a framework which offers novel ways to
(1) incorporate the phenomenal level of descrip-
tion with its representational counterparts, (2) to
integrate  the  role  of  the  body as shaping and
grounding social cognitive processes and thus (3)
to depict social  cognition as a representational,
but still embodied ability.
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